Observer properties for understanding dynamical displays: Capacities, limitations, and defaults by Proffitt, Dennis R. & Kaiser, Mary K.
NASA Technical Memorandum
102812 --.':__ :_ ,_., /'_'
Observer Properties for
Understanding Dynamical
Displays: Capacities,
Limitations, and Defaults
Dennis R. Proffitt and Mary K. Kaiser
d_'_'JF_gT_'_',r'I_u , t_YN_NIC_.L ._TS_LAY_:
CAPALII[_ _" LTMIT_II_JNc,, ,_,tlr' !;!_rAtJLTa
CSCL 05I
,'_? t- 2 7 7 g _.
February 1991
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910018450 2020-03-19T16:46:39+00:00Z

NASA Technical Memorandum 102812
Observer Properties for
Understanding Dynamical
Displays: Capacities,
Limitations, and Defaults
Dennis R. Proffitt, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia
Mary K. Kaiser, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California
February 1991
I_I/L.=,/_
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California 94035-1000

OBSERVER PROPERTIES FOR UNDERSTANDING DYNAMICAL DISPLAYS:
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SUMMARY
People's ability to extract relevant dynamical information while viewing ongoing events is dis-
cussed in terms of human capacities, limitations, and defaults. A taxonomy of event complexity is
developed which predicts which dynamical events people can and cannot construe. This taxonomy is
related to the distinction drawn in classical mechanics between particle and extended body motions.
People's commonsense understandings of simple mechanical systems are impacted little by formal
training, but rather reflect heuristical simplifications that focus on a single dimension of perceived
dynamical relevance.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, advances in microprocessor technology have made dynamic visual displays
technologically feasible Display designers have been quick to embrace these new technologies,
resulting in a commonly held belief that motion serves to enhance the informational content of visual
displays. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the perceptual characteristics of the opera-
tors utilizing these displays. In this paper, we will discuss how the information carried in the motion
of displays is defined and constrained by the capacities, limitations, and defaults the human observer
brings to the situation. We conclude that the efficacy of motion information in visual displays is
defined and constrained by observers' perceptual characteristics,
We will describe our research program which investigated people's commonsense understand-
ings of simple mechanical systems, focusing on how these understandings were formed by direct
observation of ongoing events. The types of mechanical systems studied consisted of very simple
object motions, of the sort described in the first half of an introductory physics textbook. Thus, we
examined such mechanical systems as pendulums, two-body collisions, gyroscopes, and fluid dis-
placements. For all of these events, a sufficient amount of information was present for observers to
make accurate dynamical judgments. Based on such kinematic analyses, some researchers (e.g.,
Runeson and Frykholm, 1983) have proposed that observers should be fully competent at extracting
dynamical information from visual displays. However, we found that people's ability to construe
dynamical events was highly constrained and that accurate judgments were made for only the sim-
plest of events.
Umvers_ty of Virginia.
Wedevelopedatheoryof dynamicaleventcomplexityandtestedmanyof its implications.In
essence,we foundthatpeoplecanadequatelyconstruedynamicaleventsonly whentheycanbase
theirjudgmentsonasingleobjectparameter.In all othercases,theirjudgmentsareextremelymud-
dled.We notonly examinednaivesubjects,butalsopeoplewith agreatdealof experiencewith the
systemsaboutwhichtheywerebeingtested.Theseindividualsincludedcollegeprofessorsof
physicsandhighschoolphysicsteachers.It wasfoundthattheseexpertsdifferedlittle in their com-
monsenseintuitionsaboutdynamicalsystemsandproducedthesamesortsof errorsasnaive
subjects.
Theimplicationsfor thiswork areclear.If graphicaldisplaysareto presentdynamicalinforma-
tion to operatorseffectively, thenoperatorcharacteristicsmustbetakeninto account.Moreover,
trainingoperatorsto interpretnaturaldynamicsis likely to bevery limited in effectiveness.
Theperceptualandcognitivepropertiesof thehumanobserversconsistof threecomponents:
(1) capacitiesdefinetheabilitiesof anoperatorto extractaccuratedynamicalinformationfrom a
varietyof contexts,(2) limitationsspecifytheconstraintsonhumandynamicalinformationprocess-
ing,and(3) defaultsaretheintrinsicassumptionsthattheoperatoris forcedto usewhenunableto
obtainthenecessarydynamicalinformationfrom directobservation.Eachcomponentis discussedin
turn.
2. CAPACITIES
The field of dynamics deals with the causal necessity of object motions. It treats such properties
as forces, i.e., the accelerations of masses. Since motion provides the only optical information upon
which dynamical judgments could be based, judgments about such properties as mass must rely on
dynamically constrained regularities in object motions.
Consider an intuitive example. Suppose that two balls of unequal mass are free to roll on a
smooth surface. How might one ascertain their relative mass without picking them both up? One
solution would be to roll one ball at the other, and if the collision resulted in the striking ball rico-
cheting back, then that ball is obviously the lighter of the two. Not only can qualitative judgments
about relative mass be extracted from observing collisions, but in principle, the relative mass of the
two balls is uniquely defined by the relative velocities of the balls following the collision. (The laws
of energy and momentum conservation state that the mass ratio of the balls is equivalent to the ratio
of their projected velocities onto an axis orthogonal to the path of the striking ball.) Similarly, there
exist regularities in the motions of all mechanical systems that specify aspects of their dynamics. The
human factors question is to determine the extent to which people can extract these dynamical prop-
erties when viewing events.
2.1 The Influence of Animation on Dynamical Judgments
In some contexts, viewing ongoing events results in quite accurate dynamical intuitions. This fact
is especially striking when these judgments are at odds with people's expressed beliefs. Recently, a
large number of investigations have been published that summarize commonsense beliefs about
dynamics. These studies on dynamical understandings, termed "Intuitive Physics" by McCloskey
(1983), showed that people often express erroneous beliefs about simple object motions when
assessed in static, paper-and-pencil contexts.
Kaiser and Proffitt (Kaiser, Proffitt, Whelan, and Hecht, 1990; Kaiser, Proffitt, and Anderson,
1985) investigated most of McCloskey and his colleagues' situations by asking people to make
judgments using paper-and-pencil examples, and when viewing animated, computer-graphics simu-
lations of these events. The previous results were replicated for the paper-and-pencil problems.
However, it was found that when viewing dynamic displays, people consider simulations of their
erroneous predictions to be anomalous, and select natural motions as being correct.
Consider, for example, the pendulum problem in which subjects are asked to draw the trajectory
of a pendulum' s bob after its tether breaks at the instant when the bob was at the apex of its arc.
Most erroneous responses predict that the bob will fall along a parabolic path rather than straight
down. Now, at the instant that the bob is at its apex, it is stationary. Ask anyone what happens when
a stationary object is dropped and they will predict a straight-down trajectory. The difficulty that
people have with the pendulum question clearly involves their inability to construe the state of the
bob's motion at the instant when the tether breaks. When viewing the ongoing event, the object's
two motion states--swinging versus fallingware clearly separated in time. This segregation aids
observers' judgments; when they see the anomalous outcome, they recognize it is not physically
possible.
2.2 Motion Sensitivities
As is discussed in the next section, even when viewiag ongoing events, people have an exceed-
ingly poor appreciation for the dynamical significance of rotation. This could be due to two possibili-
ties. First, it might be that the human visual system is not able to discriminate angular velocities as
well as it can linear ones. A second alternative would allow for equivalent linear and angular sensi-
tivities, but different processing capabilities at a deeper level.
Kaiser (1990) found that angular velocities are discriminated very well--not quite as well as lin-
ear velocities, but close. This implies that our poor appreciation for rotational dynamics cannot be
attributed to an insensitivity to the relevant motions. Since the source of differential appreciation for
linear and angular dynamics is not in a differential sensitivity to these motions, it must be the case
that the perceptual system uses angular kinematics for a purpose other than dynamical analysis. We
have suggested (Proffitt, Kaiser, and Whelan, 1989) that this purpose is form specification. Motions
about the configural centroid tell us what an object is; motion of the configural centroid tell us where
the object is going.
3. LIMITATIONS
The limitation that people exhibit when interpreting dynamical events, even when they are able
to view the ongoing event, relates to the number of object parameters that must be represented in a
dynamical representation. The simplest events require only that an observer notices the position over
time of the object's center of mass. Most events, however, require that other aspects of the object be
noticed as well and integrated. Yet, the complexity of these events exceeds our ability to perceptu-
ally penetrate their dynamics. This account of dynamical event complexity is detailed in Proffitt and
Gilden (1989). We summarize it below.
3.1 Particle and Extended Body Motions
There exists a definite limit to the simplicity of mechanical systems. This limit defines two cate-
gories of dynamical events: Particle motions and extended body motions. These two classes of
events are distinguished by the number of object properties that are relevant to interpreting its
motion. For particle systems, only the motion of the object's center of mass is relevant to its dynam-
ics. For extended body systems, mass distribution, orientation, rotation, and other properties are
dynamically relevant variables. It is important to keep in mind that the relevance of object properties
depends not on the object itself, but on the motion context in which the object is observed.
Consider the two following contexts for the motion of a top: (1) Free fall of a top that has been
dropped in a gravitational field, and (2) precession of a spinning top that is balanced on a pedestal in
a gravitational field. Both are examples of a top falling, but the two motions are quite different, as
are the properties of the top that are of dynamical relevance. For example, the shape of the top only
matters if a torque is applied to it. The trajectory of the center of mass of a spinning top in free fall is
identical to that of a nonspinning one. On the other hand, a top that is supported by a pedestal is
subject to a gravitational torque about the point of contact. In this situation, spinning is relevant to
the top's behavior. A nonspinning top falls down; a spinning top falls sideways--that is, it precesses.
Thus, spinning tops have many more dynamically relevant features.
Dynamical analyses of particle motions are much simpler than are those of extended body
motions. This is due to the increased number of variables that must be included in an adequate
dynamical representation of extended body events. Particle motions can always be understood in
terms of center-of-mass displacements. Dynamical representations of extended body motions always
relate more than one category of information. In extended body motions, it is not sufficient to know
where an object's center of mass is located. Rather, such relational properties as mass distribution--
how much of the object's mass is located where--must be appreciated. Thus, relating different cate-
gories of information requires multiplicative processes and results in multidimensional quantities
that do not relate directly to categories of perception.
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3.2Adequate Dynamical Understandings are Limited to Particle Motion
Commonsense understandings are fairly good for particle motions. Although people sometimes
make erroneous judgments in pencil-and-paper contexts, their dynamical intuitions are quite accurate
when they actually observe the ongoing events (Kaiser, Proffitt, Whelan, and Hecht, 1990). How-
ever, when people attempt to form dynamical understandings of extended body motions, dynamical
competence begins to break down in both static and ongoing contexts. This can be seen in the way
people understand the dynamics of simple angular systems.
We conducted a large-scale investigation of commonsense understandings of the dynamics of
rolling wheels and gyroscopes (Proffitt, Kaiser, and Whelan, 1990). An example of one of the ques-
tions asked in this study was: What influences the rate that a wheel will roll down an inclined
plane--its radius, mass, or mass distribution? In fact, the participants of this study were not asked
this question directly. Rather, they were shown pairs of wheels that differed on one of these dimen-
sions and asked to predict which member of the pair would roll down the ramp in the least time, or
whether both wheels would roll at the same rate. The results of this study showed that people are
somewhat unsure about the influence of radius or mass on a wheel's roiling behavior, but generally
agreed that mass distribution (one wheel was a solid disk and the other a rim) was irrelevant. The
multidimensional quantity of moment of inertia that describes mass distribution was the only rele-
vant dynamical variable m this situation; however, it was virtually ignored.
Next, we assessed an observer' s implicit dynamical appreciation of moment of inertia by creating
an animated computer graphics display consisting of a satellite spinning in space. This satellite was
constructed solely out of solar panels that could open or close, thereby affecting the satellite's
moment of inertia. (This situation is analogous to a twirling ice skater who extends or contracts
his/her arms.) In a natu' :2 situation, opening the satellite's solar panels would cause its spinning rate
to slow, whereas closing the panels would result in an increase in angular velocity. In the animated
stimulus displays, opening and closing the panels resulted in a variety of spin rates. The observer's
task was to judge whether the resulting angular velocity was the natural outcome of the satellite's
changing shape, or whether it could only have been produced by some unseen force. Subjects made
highly qualitative judgments about the influence of changing shape on angular momentum. For the
cases in which the satellite's solar panels opened, they judged the following outcomes to be unnatu-
ral without an external force: (1) The satellite stops and reverses its direction of spin, or (2) the
satellite simply stops. All other outcomes were judged to be equally natural. In addition to the natu-
ral slowing rate, these other outcomes included a situation in which the satellite's angular velocity
remained unchanged, one in which it actually sped up, and two in which the spinning rate slowed,
but by an incorrect amount. Equivalent results were obtained when the satellite closed its solar pan-
els. Clearly, these subjects demonstrated only the most rudimentary understanding of the influence
of mass distribution on angular momentum.
Studies performed in conjunction with those on understanding wheel dynamics showed that
people have very poor comprehension of gyroscopic motions in at least two respects. First, they do
not realize that everyday objects with which they have interacted behave like gyroscopes. This was
found to be the case when they were questioned about the behavior of bicycles. Even a group of
bicycle racers showed little awareness of the gyroscopic properties of their bicycles. Second, when
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viewing aspinninggyroscope,peopleexhibit amazement,butnocomprehensionof whatprevents
thegyroscopefrom falling over.
3.3 Formal Training Does Little to Influence Immediate Intuitions about Extended Body
Dynamics
The study described above was repeated with a group of 20 high school physics teachers
(Proffitt, Kaiser, and Whelan, 1990). It was found that their commonsense understandings of angular
systems did not differ from those of the unsophisticated students. Although these teachers could
solve the problems analytically (if given time and writing materials), they failed to evidence any
benefit from years of instructing others about these simple mechanical systems when forced to rely
on their immediate intuitions.
In addition, more informal tests were performed with university physics professors. Again, when
these individuals were asked to respond quickly and were prohibited from writing down the relevant
equations, their responses differed little from those of naive subjects.
We conclude that expert knowledge about dynamical systems does not penetrate commonsense
intuitions. Physicists and physics teachers share with naive individuals a sense of befuddlement
about the types of extended body motions that we examined. Learning physics does not involve a
restructuring of commonsense. Rather it is concerned with a change in the domains of understand-
ing--a shift from the phenomenal world to the formal world of physics theory. Even if it is not pos-
sible to see what is going on with a rolling wheel, it is easy to "see" what is going on with its
mathematics.
4. DEFAULTS
Research on people's ability to interpret extended body motions revealed the following
propensities.
4.1 Particle Motion Bias
People tend to treat extended body systems as if they were particle motions. That is, extended
object properties are deemed to be irrelevant and judgments are based solely upon center of mass
dynamics. We have proposed that the source of this bias is intrinsic to the perceptual organization of
motion information (Proffitt, Kaiser, and Whelan, 1990).
In perceiving rotational motions, the perceptual system performs an analysis that emphasizes the
extraction of form at the expense of recovering information needed for dynamical analyses. Consider
wheel-generated motions. Every point on a rolling wheel follows one of three possible classes of
motion paths: cycloids, prolate cycloids, or straight lines. When viewing a rolling wheel, however,
these trajectories are not seen. Rather, the perceptual system analyzes motion into two components:
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(1) Relativerotations--all pointsareseenasrevolvingabouttheirconfiguralcentroid,and(2) a
commonmotionwhich is thetrajectoryof thecentroid(Proffitt, Cutting,andStier, 1979).
Relativerotationsarenotonly separatedfrom commonmotions,but alsothesetwo motioncom-
ponentshavequitedifferentperceptualsignificances:Rotationsspecifyform,whereascommon
motiondefinesdisplacementrelativeto theobserver.Theperceivedcommonmotion is themotion
pathof thecentroidof relativerotations.Undertheassumptionof uniformdensity,thiscentroidcor-
respondsto theform's centerof mass.Thus,theperceivedmotionof thewholeobject--its common
observerrelativedisplacement--isaparticlemotion.
In essence,weproposethattheperceptualsystemperformsananalysisthatextractsrotational
motionsfor thepurposeof recoveringform.Commonmotionsareusedto defineparticlemotion
dynamics.Thus,theonly motionthat isavailablefor dynamicalanalysisis commonmotion.Conse-
quentlypeopleshowperceptualcompetencefor dynamicsonly whentherelevantmotionsarethose
of anobject'scenterof mass,andtheonly relevantobjectmotionsfor dynamicalintuitionsarepar-
ticle motions.
4.2 Heuristics
In some extended body motion situations, people may be aware that more than one dimension is
of dynamical importance; however, they do not combine this information into an appropriate multi-
dimensional representation. Rather, they employ implicit heuristics, each of which relates to one of
the dynamically relevant dimensions in the event and ignore the rest. A clear example of this type of
reasoning can be seen in how people dynamically evaluate collisions (Gilden and Proffitt, 1989).
Imagine a situation in which there are two billiard bdlls of unequal mass, and one of these balls,
being initially stationary, is set into motion when it is struck by the other. An analysis of the physical
laws of momentum and energy conservation reveals that the post-collision projected velocities of the
two balls onto an axis orthogonal to the pre-collision path of the striking ball defines a ratio equiva-
lent to their relative masses.
When asked to judge mass ratios while observing computer simulations of collisions, people do
not spontaneously form this multidimensional relationship between velocities and angles. Rather,
they base their judgments on one or the other of two heuristics that relate to these dimensions. The
velocity heuristic can be stated as: Following a collision, the faster moving ball is lighter. The other
heuristic relates to deflection angle: After a collision, the ball that ricochets is lighter. People based
their relative mass judgments on the heuristic that was related to the most salient dimension present
in the event (i.e., either velocity or deflection angle). In many situations such heuristical analyses led
to good performance. However, when the two heuristics give conflicting predictions, performance
falls to the level of chance. Moreover, subjects never "averaged" the ricochet heuristic with the
velocity heuristic to effect a compromise.
We found that people have difficulty switching from one heuristic to another. This problem was
revealed in a set of studies conducted on people's commonsense understandings of Archimedes
Principle (Kaiser, Proffitt, Whelan, and Hecht, 1990). Here, it was found that people could make
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accuratejudgmentsaboutfluid volumedisplacementsonly whenjudgmentscouldbebasedonone
objectparameter.
Considerthefollowing questionadaptedfromWalker's (1977)book,The Flying Circus of
Physics with Answers: Suppose that a toy boat is placed into a fish tank. A heavy bolt is put into the
boat, and the water level in the tank is marked. If the bolt is removed fi'om the boat and dropped into
the fish tank, then what will happen to the height of the water level with respect to the previous
mark?
If the questions asked of university students about fluid displacement required them to reason
about one object parameter at a time, then their performance was nearly perfect. This leads to the
assumption that they had a thorough understanding of Archimedes Principle. An example of a one-
dimensional question is the following: Two objects of different weight are observed floating in iden-
tical fish tanks; which object displaces the most water? On the other hand, if they were asked a
question, such as the above bolt-in-the-boat question, then their performance fell to a chance level.
(In this question the bolt must be construed as a multidimensional entity: Its mass is relevant while it
is in the boat; however, its volume becomes its relevant dimension when it is placed in the water.)
Most people erroneously reported that, when the bolt was put into the tank, the water level would
remain the same as it had been when it was in the boat. Similar performance was found for other
questions that required an object to be construed as having more than one dynamically relevant
dimension.
We constructed a tank in which the water level could be rapidly raised or lowered by the experi-
menter at the moment when the bolt was placed into the tank. Subjects were presented with a toy
boat floating in the tank. A heavy bolt was placed in the boat. They were told that the bolt would be
taken out of the boat and placed in the tank's water. They were also told that the water level might be
raised or lowered by the experimenter. Their task was to watch pairs of events and determine
whether the tank's water level had been influenced by the experimenter. In this situation, observers
reported that the natural event looked correct, and that their own prediction (i.e., the water would rise
to its original level after the bolt was removed from the boat and placed into the tank) looked highly
contrived.
The superior performance that was observed with a demonstration of the problem, relative to the
verbally presented task, is a general finding in many situations that we have investigated. Often, the
dimensionality of events are segregated in time when an event is observed; observing the bolt as it
was taken out of the boat allowed the subjects to see how this heavy object produced a large dis-
placement. Observing the small bolt being placed into the tank, and watching the water level rush
back to its initial level, induced considerable mirth, as the bolt's size had then become so salient. In
this displacement problem, the dimensions of weight and size are separated in time in the ongoing
event, but not in the verbally presented question.
4.3Kinematic Representation for Apparent Motion
A basic default in observers' motion processing is the representation given to ambiguous
motions. Following Shepard (1984), we found evidence suggesting that apparent motions are given a
kinematic, as opposed to a dynamical, representation.
We investigated apparent motion trajectories for stimuli flashed in different locations and at dif-
ferent orientations (Proffitt, Gilden, Kaiser, and Whelan, 1988). The fact that this event involved an
orientation change defines it as being an extended body motion. There exist two theoretically moti-
vated alternatives for the apparent trajectories that could be seen. (1) The stimulus shape could fol-
low a single rotational trajectory defining the minimum motion for a kinematic representation of this
event (Foster, 1975). A kinematic representation treats the situation purely in terms of motions, dis-
regarding dynamical considerations. (2) For the other alternative, the stimulus could be seen to rotate
about its center of mass (which corresponds to the centroid for forms of uniform density) as this
point moved linearly. This alternative represents a dynamical minimization of energy (assuming that
the stimulus has some mass and is otherwise unconstrained with regard to its potential motion paths).
It was found that apparent extended body motions followed curved paths; however, these perceived
trajectories were actually circular (i.e., pure kinematic trajectories) for only a restricted range of
parameters. Hecht (1989) extended these findings to objects that are perceived to change orientation
about an axis that is not normal to the picture plane (i.e., rotations in depth).
These results incline us toward the view that observers represent object motions in the form of a
kinematic, rather than dynamic, model. The resulting kinematic variables form the bases for heuris-
tics that structure dynamical intuitions.
5. CONCLUSION
People spontaneously extract a variety of environmental properties from motion information, a
fact that can be exploited through the increased use of animation in computer graphic displays
(Kaiser and Proffitt, 1989a, b; Proffitt and Kaiser, 1989). On the other hand, there are limits to the
veracity of motion-based intuitions that become evident when they make judgments about natural
dynamics.
People's dynamical understandings are fairly good for particle motions. Although people some-
times make en'oneous predictions about these simple systems in paper-and-pencil contexts, their
dynamical judgments are quite accurate when they observe a demonstration of the dynamic event.
Again, this emphasizes the desirability of animation for displaying particle motion dynamics for
purposes of instruction or system monitoring.
When people attempt to form dynamical understandings of extended body motions, dynamical
competence breaks down. In these contexts, competence is best when the operator can deal with one
dimension of information at a time. The implicit knowledge that people possess about extended body
systems is heuristical, but each heuristic relates to only one dimension of information.
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Formaltrainingin physicsdoeslittle to improvespontaneousintuitionsaboutnaturaldynamics.
If operatorsareto be requiredto makerapidjudgmentsaboutdynamics,thentheywouldbebetter
equippedif their trainingprovidedthemwith asetof heuristicsrelevantto frequentlyencountered
situations,asopposedto moreformal trainingin physics.
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